1. Introductory data and sources

The revolt of the Satraps (365-360 BC) is known from the narration of Diodorus of Sicily, who presented a summary of Ephorus’ writings, in which he attributs the revolt to a joint movement of four Satraps from the western Asia Minor – Orontes of Mysia, Autophradates of Lydia, Ariovarzanes of Hellespontic Phrygia, Mausolus of Caria – but also to the joint forces of the area’s populace against the central authority of Artaxerxes II (405/404-359/358 BC). Pharaoh Tachus, king of the insurgents in Egypt, king Straton of Sidon in Phoenicia, and certain Greek towns (mainly Sparta and Athens) supported the revolt.¹

The sources (mainly anecdotal), including a series of inscriptions and numismatic editions, are scarce, and help in the formation of a complete picture of the upheaval that was created in Asia Minor between 365 and 360 BC. The majority of texts of that period, however, while making mention of the problems encountered in the Achaemenid administration system throughout Asia Minor, deliberately ignore any references to the revolt against Artaxerxes II.²

The narrative complications encountered in Diodorus include his regular compression of the facts mentioned, and their overall dating to the last year of the period of time that meets he is keen on.³ Thus, the revolt is dated to 362/361 BC, even though other sources mention that the actions being described belong to the period 365-360 BC. The main question that remains is whether the general uproar in Asia Minor was the result of an organized plan, or of general tendencies of laxity of control of the central authority in the western provinces, which were spontaneously created and went out without imposing a serious threat to the royal power.⁴

The basic argument of modern historians who doubt the existence of an organized revolt is the evident lack of a substantial cause. Yet, other views suggest as an adequate reason the feeling of dislike that preceded Artaxerxes’ II rising harshness after his consecutive failures against the Cadousians, and his personal discords with many leading Persians – who held high ambitions – in combination with his incapacity to rule seriously, as he had reached the late age of 80. This setting provided a great opportunity for the relevantly independent and powerful Satraps of Western Asia Minor to take advantage of this power gap.⁵

2. Historical framework

Problems in the Achaemenid administration of the western satrapies had already arised in 382 BC. Orontes, husband of Rodogoune, the king’s daughter, was disfavoured from the moment that he unfairly blamed his fellow commander Tirivazus, satrap of Lydia, for treachery in the war against the king of Cypriot Salamis Evagoras, around 382 BC.⁶ He lost the satrapy of Armenia and he was granted the less important satrapy of Mysia.⁷

Datames had formerly revolted against the other Satraps (in the period 372-370 BC), either individually or in secret agreement with Ariovarzanes, as the Latin historian Cornelius Nepos reports.⁸ Autophradates, who initially made a move against him, eventually reached an agreement with him (368 BC).

What fueled the prevalence of the crisis was Artaxerxes’ II decision in the Sousa meeting to make the Thebans his privileged interlocutors in Greece (367 BC)⁹, after Ariovarzanes’ failed attempt to reconcile the Greeks via the mission of the first mate Philiscus of Abydus to Delphi (368 BC).¹⁰

This new development led to the full isolation of the Spartan-friendly Ariovarzanes, who was proclaimed an insurgent. This proclamation was perhaps made after the recommendation of Autophradates of Lydia, who had every reason to worry about the rising influence of his fellow Satrap and, most of all, about his control of Troas, a region that was traditionally claimed by two satrapies.¹¹ Autophradates, head of the infantry, and Mausolus, head of the navy, both took sides against the insurgent. On the contrary, the Athenians and the Spartans both took Ariovarzanes’ side. The Athenians sent Timotheos to the Hellespont, with the intention to offer help to Ariovarzanes, provided that the Antalcid peace was not violated. Timotheos, after taking advantage of the prevailing situation, seized Samos and the Thracian Chersonisos, and accepted Sistus and Crithote (Thrace) from Ariovarzanes.¹² At that time, the Athenians granted Ariovarzanes the title of the Athenian citizen, as well as to two of his sons, and his officials Philiscus and Agavos from Abydus.¹³

The Spartans also supported Ariovarzanes, mainly because of the friendship between the Satrap to the old king Agesilaus. The latter intervened militarily in Ariovarzanes’ siege by Autophradates at Adramytion -or Assus, as it is also known (366/365 BC)- and succeeded in breaking it.¹⁴ Agesilaus, with the use of diplomacy, also allowed the occupation of Abydus and Sestus by the armies of Autophradates, Mausolus and Cotys of Thrace, who were besieging them.¹⁵ These failures forced Mausolus to withdraw to Caria with his entire navy, while Autophradates also ceased action in the area of Daskylion.

3. Description of facts

This is the historical context in which the generalized revolt of the people of Asia Minor was brought up by Diodorus. According to the sequence of participants in the revolt, first the Ionians, together with Ariovarzanes (already considered an insurgent) and Mausolus, turned against the king. Tachus, after he convincing the Spartans to march together and mustering a great army of mercenaries, sided with them, and they were followed by the Lycians, the Pisidians, the Pamphylians and the Cilicians, Autophradates and Orontes. Finally, the Syrians and the Phoenicians also supported the revolt. This passage is completed with a very brief narration by the historian Pompeius Trogus; Artaxerxes II, after his failure with the Cadousians, declared war against his revolted officials, first against Datames, then against Ariovarzanes and, finally, against Orontes, whom he defeated in Syria.¹⁶

The precise description and succession of the operations in several fronts is impossible. In history, the traditional school describes the revolt primarily as a movement by Orontes and Tachus, in agreement with Datames, which aimed at bringing the two armies together in Phoenicia and Palestine, so as for the final attack against Artaxerxes to be launched. For their own reasons, some serious insurgents, Orontes being among them, changed camps.¹⁷ Modern research, on the contrary, presents a much greater mixture of facts, even though they seem phenomenally unconnected, which is nevertheless not contradicted by the epigraphic and numismatic sources.

In 365-364 BC Philiscus’ murder and the continuous activity of the Greeks in the area of the Hellespont led to the collapse of the Achaemenid administration in the satrapy of Dascylius. Most of the Greek towns either sided with the Athenians, or followed an independent policy. Besides, the presence of Artavazus III, son of Pharnavazus II and grandson of the king, who was appointed satrap around 364 BC, certainly caused the Persians of the satrapy to split. This resulted in dispute between Ariovarzanes and his son Mithridates, who, upon wanting to disengage himself from his father’s evident decline, gave him in to the troop that Artaxerxes had sent for his arrest. In 363/362 BC Ariovarzanes was finally crucified at Sousa.¹⁸ Artavazus took up the administration of the satrapy in 363 BC, faced Mithridates, whose activity was focused on the eastern part of the province with Datames’ help, and finally marched against the latter (362-361 BC).¹⁹

In his effort to ensure his place, while having as allies his brothers-in-law Mentor and Memnon –Rhodian warlords who played a significant part in the history of the late Achaemenid Empire– Artavazus marched towards Troas. He hired the Athenian picaroon Charidemos as his mercenary, but was deceived by him, as the latter occupied Scepsis, Cevrene and Ilion on his behalf. For reasons that have not yet been identified, Autophradates arrested Artavazus, which was the only proof of his participation in the revolt, even though his arrest lasted for only a few months. After his release, Artavazus attacked Charidemos and put him in a difficult position. Mentor and Memnon convinced Artavazus to make a truce with the picaroon and to allow him to depart from Abydus.²⁰

Orontes’ position among the most significant insurgents should be considered safe, due to a passage by Demosthenes that mentions the rally of Greek mercenaries from the king against him.²¹ Orontes is also refered to as an insurgent in an inscription known as ‘the Pergamon chronicle’, which mentions that the town was part of his satrapy before he handed it in to Artaxerxes who later on passed away.²² In any case, the assumption of his leadership, combined with the theory of a second revolt in the decade of 350 BC, as it was supported by other historians, has been refuted. Numismatic evidence proves that Orontes issued coinage only in the Mysian towns of Cisthene and Adramytion, a fact that cannot easily be combined with his alleged, eminent position as a leader of the revolt.²³

Orontes’ activities have been placed in the hinterland of Asia Minor. With 10,000 Greek mercenaries at his service and an abundant amount of money for their payment, he set up his camp in a predetermined part of the Tmolus mountains. Thence he invaded Lydia, in the surroundings of Sardis, aiming primarily at causing inconvenience to the generals that the king had sent against him, and secondly at acquiring a rich booty.²⁴ Additionally, a skirmish is mentioned with Autophradates in Cyme, as well as a third battle where Autophradates beat him, yet without being able to eliminate him.²⁵ In Mysia, Pergamon was used as his strong fortress, as it was inhabited by his Greek allies.

On a diplomatic level, Orontes, during an exchange of embassies and negotiations with the Athenians, sold wheat to the generals and was granted the status of citizenship, probably around 361 BC.²⁶

The most important story is the one that is linked to the coordinated action between Orontes and the Egyptian pharaoh Tachus, who seized power in 363 BC. Reomithres, a junior official, was the delegate of Orontes. He abandoned his family members in Egypt where they were kept as hostages, took with him great military forces and money (50 ships and 500 talents), which he did not use to support the revolt, but for private purposes, after he acceded Artaxerxes in 360 BC. He set up his forces in Leuce and arrested most of Orontes’ Greek allies.²⁷ The most significant piece of information, however, comes from Pompeius Tragus, who mentions his defeat in Syria by Artaxerxes. Yet, such a fact could not pass unnoticed by other sources, so the majority of modern historians question its validity. It can be combined with a reference to an expedition by Ochus (who later became Artaxerxes III) against Egypt, while his father Artaxerxes II was still alive.²⁸ Finally, the possibility of his cooperation with Datames in the project of marching against Artaxerxes, based on his crossing the river Euphrates, even though it was formerly linked to Orontes’ move to Syria, has been abandoned today.²⁹

Finally, Orontes, prompted by the probability of receiving the satrapy of the entire coastal Asia Minor as a reward, as mentioned by Diodorus, or most likely because of Reomithres’ revolt, his loss of Egyptian forces and his inability to face Autophradates, changed camps, gave his mercenaries and his allies in to the king’s representatives, and sided with Artaxerxes. His luck remains unknown, but he must have died a while later, around 360 BC or in 359/358 BC.³⁰

The motives of Tachus of Egypt and of Straton of Sidon were different. They provided the chance of throwing off the Persian yoke on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of ensuring via alliances their expansion to Syria and Phoenicia. The Athenians had reached negotiations with Straton, as an inscription mentions, but it remains doubtful whether they were associated with his revolt.³¹ With the support of the mercenaries under Athenaeus Chavrias and Agesilaus, Tachus attempted to capture Phoenicia, but in Egypt the usurper Nectanevau was proclaimed pharaoh, and was supported by Agesilaus. In the end, Tachus was dethroned by his own troops and fled to Straton. He soon surrendered to Artaxerxes.³²

The evidence that supports Mausolus’ participation in the movement is scant. Apart from Diodorus’ passage, Xenophon cites that Mausolus and Tachus kept secret contacts with Agesilaus and backed him financially.³³ On the contrary, Mausolus was very faithful to Artaxerxes plans against Ariovarzanes in 366-365 BC, and later on, in cooperation with Autophradates, managed to seize Ephesus and various other small towns that Ierophytus of Ephesus had conquered and released from the Persian yoke.³⁴ At any rate, the fact that Mausolus participated in the revolt, probably his only goal being to support his position, is evident from two events; that he refused to impose taxes on Artaxerxes and that he convinced the citizens of Mylasa to construct walls, in order to pose a threat to the impending invasion of the royal troops, which never actually took place.³⁵

In neighbouring Lycia it seems that a certain Pericles was the leader of the insurgents, initially a dynast at Limyra, who succeeded in conquering Artemvares who was loyal to Autophradates, and to expand his influence until Telmessus. After the revolt of the Satraps, Mausolus also managed to increase his influence in Lycia, which might mean that he and Pericles came into conflict, with the latter’s end remaining unverified.³⁶

A currently lost inscription is of high significance for the discussion, as it mentioned a delegate of the Satraps whose aim was to probe the Greeks for help. The reply was a declaration of independence by the Greeks in the mainland, from any type of Persian official, be it the king or the Satraps, as well as the declaration of their strict and neutral stance. Even though the text’s interpretation has been questioned, it appears as though it attests to the general picture of an organized revolt in Western Asia Minor, as well as to the importance of the outcome that a likely joint action of Greek forces with one of the opposing sides might have produced.³⁷

4. Results

The activities that took place in the years 365-360 BC did not significantly affect the topography of Asia Minor, with the exception perhaps of Daskylion’s satrapy in Hellespontic Phrygia, which lost control of the Hellespont. Datames’ dominance, if Cilicia is to be included, was divided in three satrapies – that of Cilicia and two Cappadocian ones. Mausolus’ position was strengthened, as he expanded his dominion to Lycia and began plotting against Athenian acquisitions in the area of southern Aegean. The Egyptian revolt was quickly repressed by the successor of Artaxerxes II, while the death of Agesilaus in the Egyptian front and the difficulties that Athens faced with the Thracians, its own allies later on and Phillip II of Macedon, meant that Greek intervention in Asia Minor was about to end.

The most serious consequence of the revolt was the realization by the Greeks that the Achaemenid administration of Asia Minor presented remarkable weaknesses. In connection with the region’s disastrous consequences of the Spartan expedition in the beginning of the 4th century BC, the Persian power in the area was reduced – mainly militarily – to such an extent, that it remained extremely difficult to avoid the entrusting of the army’s administration in Greek mercenaries, but to also deter the imposition of local tyrants by them.